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Abstract:
This paper analyses the impacts of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) using a balanced four-year panel 
of 461 households from 2004/5, 2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11 agricultural seasons. We find evidence of economy 
wide and input market effects of the subsidy programme. The economy-wide effects of the subsidy programme 
are strong particularly due to lower maize prices and increased ganyu wage rates. The economy-wide effects of the 
subsidy which arise from higher ganyu wage rates, reduced time spent on ganyu, availability of maize at local level 
and lower prices of maize have enabled poor households to access maize when they run out of their own production. 
With respect to input market effects, with 2010/11 conditions and quantities of subsidised fertiliser, a 1 percent 
increase in subsidised fertilisers reduces commercial demand by 0.15 – 0.21 percent. However, using various welfare 
indicators, we find mixed results on the direct beneficiary household effects of the subsidy programme from panel 
data analysis and there is no overwhelming evidence on the relationship between repeated access and impacts of 
the subsidy. The direct beneficiary impacts on food consumption, self-assessed poverty and overall welfare are weak 
and mixed while there is some statistically significant evidence of positive impacts on primary school enrolment, 
under-5 illness and shocks. Nonetheless, the impact analysis highlights the challenges of targeting and sharing 
of subsidy among households, which may have implications on the direct beneficiary impacts and prospects to 
sustainably graduate from the programme.
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1.0	 Introduction	
This paper analyses the impact of Malawi’s Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme (FISP, previously known as the 
Malawi Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, MAISP) 
on selected indicators of household welfare. The 2010/11 
season marked its sixth year of implementation and some 
households have had continuous access while others 
have had intermittent access to subsidised fertilisers. 
Although the main objective of the input subsidy is to 
increase productivity and food security, it plays multiple 
roles and has the potential to influence other social and 
economic indicators of well-being. Previous evaluations 
of the FISP have focused on a narrow range of impact 
indicators and the analysis has largely been based on 
cross-section data (SOAS et al, 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 
2010b). Furthermore, the analysis of impact of the subsidy 
programme on maize production and productivity has 
been marred by the difficulties in obtaining consistent 
data on area under maize cultivation and maize output 
based on recall methods and yield sub-plots (Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2010a). However, apart from productivity 
and maize production and self-assessment of poverty, 
there are other socio-economic indicators that can 
be influenced by the availability of food through the 
subsidy programme. These other indicators include 
food consumption, schooling and health and resilience 
to shocks and stresses.
SOAS et al (2008) and Dorward et al (2010) suggest 
various pathways through which a large-scale farm input 
subsidy programme affects different types of households, 
different markets and the economy. These effects are 
classified into effects on the macroeconomic environment 
(fiscal, monetary, growth and food price effects), effects 
on input markets (displacement and investments in input 
supply systems) and rural household impacts (direct 
beneficiary effects and rural economy-wide effects). SOAS 
et al (2008) present a framework for understanding the 
different direct and indirect impacts of input subsidies on 
different households in a rural economy, as presented in 
Figure 1. The effects on recipient households arise from 
the direct beneficiary impacts of the subsidy programme 
through increased production and incomes from sales of 
agricultural output, resale of coupons by poor households 
and displacement use by less poor households.
The other effects arise from economy-wide impacts 
owing to the scale of the programme through the price 
effects – reduced price of food and increase in wages. 
These economy-wide effects affect both recipients 
and non-recipient households in the rural economy. 
The economy-wide impacts can also affect the 
macroeconomic environment and promote economic 
growth. The increased incomes arising from direct 
beneficiary impacts and economy-wide impacts may 
stimulate further investments and diversification in farm 
and non-farm activities, with implications on the overall 
growth of the economy.
These various effects of the farm input subsidy 
programme depend on the implementation efficiency 
and the cost-effectiveness of the programme and the 
various shocks and stresses that households experience. 
At household level, the size of the benefits or subsidy 
package, the targeting of beneficiaries, the timing of 
access to the subsidy and access to extension services 
are critical in realising direct beneficiary benefits from the 
subsidy programme. SOAS et al (2008) and Dorward et al 
(2010) highlight specific issues that can affect the direct 
beneficiary impacts of the subsidy such as targeting 
(with the better off more likely to receive the subsidy), 
size of the benefits (with widespread redistribution of 
coupons within the village), improvements in the timing 
of receipts and limited access to extension advice on 
fertiliser and seed variety use. The input market and 
economy-wide impacts also depend on the efficiency and 
Figure 1: Understanding household and local economy impacts of input subsidies
Figure 1 Understanding Household and Local Economy Impacts of Input Subsidies
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cost effectiveness of the subsidy programme including 
scale of the programme, procurement, targeting and 
distribution of inputs. For instance, reduced maize 
prices and increased wage rates may kick-start growth 
in the rural economy while poor targeting may lead to 
displacement of commercial sales of farm inputs and 
exclusion of the private sector in the implementation of 
the subsidy programme may reduce private investment in 
input supply systems. SOAS et al (2008) and Ricker-Gilbert 
et al (2010) find evidence of displacement of commercial 
sales of fertilisers due to the subsidy programme.
This paper is organized into five sections. In the next 
section, we document the methodology for evaluating 
the impact of the subsidy programme on various socio-
economic indicators. Section 3 analyses the impacts of 
subsidies on various indicators, including indicators of 
the economy-wide, input markets and direct beneficiary 
household effects of the subsidy programme. Section 4 
focuses on the impact analysis, mainly based on the life 
stories from selected beneficiary households. Finally, we 
offer concluding remarks.
2.0	 Methodology
2.1 Data sets
With the advantage of periodic evaluation of the 
subsidy programme, the design of the third Farm Input 
Subsidy Survey (FISS3) in 2011 incorporated questions 
that were also asked to the same households in the 
second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) in 2004/05. 
This allows us to compare the same households, with 
and without subsidies since the 2005/06 season, and 
provides an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the 
subsidy programme on direct beneficiary households 
over time. We also use the Agricultural Input Subsidy 
Survey (AISS1) covering the 2006/07 season and AISS2 
covering the 2008/09 season. This leads to a four-year 
panel data set covering 2004/05, 2006/07, 2008/09 
and 2010/11 seasons. The FISS3 also tracked access to 
fertiliser subsidy since the programme started, and this 
has enabled us to control for the number of times the 
household has had access to fertiliser subsidies between 
the 2005/06 and 2010/11 seasons. Hence, we were able 
to investigate the impact of repeated access to the 
input subsidy programme on various socio-economic 
outcomes. The study also uses qualitative data from 
the FISS3 conducted between March and April 2011. In 
the qualitative approach, data was collected through 8 
focus group discussions, 24 key informant interviews and 
life histories for 64 households representing vulnerable 
groups in 8 districts.
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by 
survey and number of times households have had 
access to fertiliser subsidy. It is helpful to identify three 
groups regarding households’ subsidy receipt: a small 
proportion who never had access to subsidised fertiliser 
(no access), a much larger group who had access to 
subsidised fertiliser at least once and up to five times in six 
seasons (intermittent access), and those who had access 
to subsidised fertiliser six times (continuous access) from 
the 2005/06 to 2010/11 seasons. These groups accounted 
for 4%, 51% and 45% of households, respectively. Most 
of the households are, therefore, repeat beneficiaries1. 
In terms of headship of households in 2010/11, 66% and 
34% of the sample households were male- and-female 
headed, respectively. The distribution of households by 
poverty status in IHS2 also shows that the overall sample 
had equal numbers of households that were poor and 
non-poor.
2.2 Methods of analysis
The analysis of the impact of the subsidy programme 
is categorized into three: economy-wide effects, input 
market effects and direct beneficiary household effects. 
2.2.1	 Economy-wide	impacts
The analysis of economy-wide impacts is based on the 
trends of selected macroeconomic variables such as gross 
domestic product, agricultural output, general price 
levels and the fiscal balance; and household level data on 
maize prices and rural wages. In addition, the information 
from focus group interviews and key informants is used to 
Table 1 Distribution of sample by panel and access to fertiliser subsidy
Number 
of seasons 
with 
access
Panel households Headship, 2010/11 (%) Poverty status in IHS2 
(%)
Proportions of poor & 
non-poor (%)
N % Male Female Poor Non-poor Poor Non-
poor
0 19 4 75 25 33 67 2 5
1 42 9 75 25 57 43 7 8
2 35 7 72 28 48 52 7 6
3 33 7 60 40 48 52 8 10
4 45 10 66 34 45 55 97 9
5 80 17 55 45 49 51 16 16
6 208 45 68 32 52 48 50 47
Total 461 100 66 34 50 50 100 100
Note: Weighted figures
Working Paper 065 www.future-agricultures.org5
confirm some of the rural economy-wide impacts of the 
subsidy programme. It is not possible to quantify direct 
causal effects of the subsidy, but it is possible to evaluate 
the strength and patterns of association between subsidy 
implementation, its direct effects, and wider changes.
2.2.2	 Input	market	impacts
This analysis is based on information from the 
household survey and the qualitative data and focuses 
on trends in purchases of commercial fertilisers and the 
impact of the subsidy programme. We use a regression 
based approach to estimate the demand in commercial 
fertilisers using panel households and we use qualitative 
interview data to triangulate the econometric and 
descriptive results. There may be selection bias in the 
household decision to participate in the commercial 
fertiliser market. We therefore use a two-step estimation 
procedure. In the first stage, we estimate the probit model 
of participation in the commercial fertiliser market using 
distance to the main road (as the identification variable) 
and household characteristics and quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers received by the household. In the second step, 
we estimate the demand for commercial fertilisers 
controlling for the selection bias using the Inverse Mills 
ratio obtained from the first stage. Two sub-samples 
are used to estimate the second stage equation: panel 
households that initially bought commercial fertilisers 
in IHS2 and panel households that bought commercial 
fertilisers in either IHS2 or FISS3. The null hypothesis is 
that subsidised fertilisers do not reduce the demand for 
commercial fertilisers at household level.
2.2.3	 Direct	beneficiary	impacts
We use the panel regression method which exploits 
the matched panel data for rounds of data collection: 
IHS2) covering the 2002/3 and 2003/4 agricultural 
seasons, AISS1 for the 2006/7 season, AISS2 for the 2008/9 
season, and FISS3 for 2010/11 agricultural season. For the 
panel data analysis, we use the fixed effects panel data 
strategy with the following specification:
where i is the individual household, t is the wave of the 
survey (2004/05, 2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11), k indexes 
the household categorization of access to subsidies 
over the past 6 years, αi are individual fixed effects, δt is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 for the each round of the 
survey (with 2004/5 as the base category), otherwise 
equal to zero, and (δt * FISPk) is the interaction dummy that 
is equal to 1 only for households that received fertiliser 
subsidy in access category k, Y is the impact indicator, X 
is a vector of household characteristics. The coefficient 
β gives the impact of the subsidy programme. The FISS 
in 2010/11 tracked access to fertiliser subsidy since the 
programme started, and this has enabled us to account 
for the number of times the household had access to 
fertiliser subsidies between the 2005/06 and 2010/11 
seasons. Households are categorized into five groups 
represented by dummy variables: never had access (base 
category), accessed 1 – 2 times, accessed 3 – 4 times, 
accessed 5 times and accessed 6 times (continuously).
The impact indicators used in the regression model 
include food security, education and heath, assets and 
welfare and shocks2. Alternatively, we measure access to 
the subsidy programme by the quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers in place of dummy variables. The panel analysis 
is based on the full panel sample (461 households) and a 
sub-sample of panel households that were identified as 
poor based on per capita expenditure in the IHS2 (227 
households). The latter allows us to investigate the impact 
of the subsidy programme on households that had the 
same initial condition prior to the subsidy programme.
Table 2 presents the various indicators that have 
been selected to test various hypotheses on the direct 
beneficiary impacts of the subsidy programme. In 
addition to the broad hypothesized relationships in table 
2, we also expect the subsidy to have larger impacts on 
households that have had access to subsidised fertilisers 
in all of the past 6 seasons compared to those that have 
had less access. This implies that there should be a 
positive trend in the value of the coefficients of times 
of receipt of subsidy, as the frequency of receipt increases 
from 1 to 6 times.
There are, however, two main caveats to the household-
level analysis of direct beneficiary impacts. First, most of 
the indicators are subjective assessments by households; 
hence with the difficulties of calibration and differences 
in the timing of interviews, caution must be exercised in 
interpreting the panel level results. Second, if economy-
wide effects are much stronger, such that the subsidy 
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Table 2 Beneficiary household level impact indicators and hypotheses
Outcome variables Impact Indicators Impact: Alternative 
Hypothesis
Food Security 1) Adequacy in food consumption in past month Positive
Schooling and Health 1) Primary school enrolment at household level
2) Incidence of under-5 illness
Positive
Negative
Subjective Poverty 1) Subjective assessment of poverty status Positive
Shocks and Stresses 1) Number of shocks experiences by household
2) Incidence of severe agricultural-related shocks
Negative
Negative
Note: Weighted figures
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benefits all households, the impacts at household level 
may be weak regardless of direct benefits or number 
of times of access to subsidised fertilisers in the past 6 
agricultural seasons. In this case the econometric results 
may not be able to pick these small changes.
3.0	 Impacts	of	the	Farm	
Input	Subsidies
3.1 Economy-wide effects
The macroeconomic environment since the 
introduction of the farm input subsidy programme has 
remained relatively stable. Table 3 shows trends in some 
of the macroeconomic indicators between 2005 and 
2010. From 2005 up to 2008 the economy witnessed 
increases in the both agricultural and gross domestic 
product. Since 2009, the economy has witnessed a 
decline in the growth rate but it has still been growing at 
above 6 percent. Agricultural output grew by 6.6 percent 
in 2010 compared to 10.4 percent in 2009. The reduction 
in agricultural growth rates have been attributed to the 
dry spell that hit some parts of the country. The overall 
growth rate in gross domestic product in 2010 was largely 
helped by the 53 percent growth rate in the mining 
sector, implying that growth could have been much 
lower without the emerging mining sector. Nonetheless, 
both the growth rates in gross domestic product and 
agricultural output have been partly attributed to the 
subsidy programme and the good rains that the country 
has witnessed over the past 6 agricultural season.
The deficit/GDP ratio in the fiscal budget has been 
worsening, particularly up to 2009 from -1.5 percent 
in 2006 to -8.2 percent in 2009. However, based on 
projected actual figures, there was expectation of a 
surplus of 1.6 percent of gross domestic product in 2010. 
More worrying is the increase in the indebtedness of the 
country from 8.2 percent of gross domestic product in 
2006 to 15.7 percent of gross domestic product in 2010. 
The peak in domestic debt appears in 2008/2009, which 
also witnessed high fiscal deficit/GDP ratio and this was 
also the year the subsidy cost was 6.6 percent of gross 
domestic product and the subsidy budget was over-
spent by about 87 percent, partly due to higher fertiliser 
prices and partly due to expansion of the programme 
(Dorward et al, 2010).   
There has also been price stability over the period of 
implementation of the farm input subsidy, with inflation 
on a declining trend from 15.4 percent in 2005 to a single 
digit level of 7.4 percent in 2010, although maize prices 
rose dramatically from early 2008 to early 2009, before 
falling back in mid 2009 to 2010. Figure 2, right panel, 
shows that inflation continued to fall owing to the low 
prices of maize that have been experienced in 2009.  Maize 
prices account for a significant proportion of the food 
component of the consumer price index, and reduction 
in maize prices have exerted downward pressure on the 
general price level and food inflation. Reductions in the 
price of maize in 2006/7 and 2009/10 are attributed to 
the economy-wide effect of the subsidy programme that 
improved availability of maize in the economy3. These 
positive macroeconomic developments have also been 
accompanied by reduction in the projected incidence of 
poverty as shown in figure 2, left panel. Since 2006, the 
poverty rate based on the model-based prediction fell 
from 52 percent to 39 percent in 2009.
Some of these national level developments were 
confirmed from the household survey and qualitative 
interviews data. Figure 3 shows the levels of maize and 
tobacco prices and ganyu (casual labour) wage rates 
between 2009 and 2011. With respect to maize prices, 
overall the prices at which households bought maize was 
below Malawi Kwacha (MKW)30 per kilogram4, except 
for January 2010 (figure 3a). Generally, Blantyre and 
Thyolo experienced higher maize prices while Lilongwe 
and Kasungu experienced lower maize prices. Tobacco 
prices generally fell between 2009 and 2010 (figure 3b), 
although in Blantyre and Zomba households reported 
improved tobacco prices compared to the previous 
season. With respect to wages (figure 3c), there is an 
increase in wages over time as reported by households, 
and these increases occurred in all the districts surveyed. 
In terms of levels, in Mzimba and Kasungu households 
reported the highest wage rates while Thyolo and 
Phalombe households reported the lowest wage rates.
These wage rates and maize price developments were 
also widely reported in focus group discussions and life 
histories of some of the beneficiaries. In most beneficiary 
life histories, among poor households, engaging in ganyu 
to earn income to purchase food is a common strategy 
and such improvements in wages and reduction in 
maize prices made maize more affordable even for poor 
households. This is confirmed in figure 3d which shows 
Table 3 Macroeconomic performance indicators, 2005 – 2010 (%)
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Real Agricultural Growth
Real GDP Growth
Inflation
Deficit/GDP Ratio (actual)
Deficit/GDP Ratio (budget)
Debt/GDP ratio
-7.8
3.3
15.4
-0.4
-2.6
-
12.3
6.7
13.9
-1.4
-1.5
8.2
12.3
8.6
8.0
-4.0
-1.8
8.2
11.8
9.7
8.7
-6.3
-7.8
17.4
10.4
7.7
8.4
-5.5
-8.2
15.1
6.6
6.7
7.4
1.6
4.0
15.7
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review, 22 (4), 2010
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real increases in ganyu wages in terms of its maize grain 
purchasing power. Overall, the maize purchasing power 
of daily ganyu wages increased by 47 percent between 
January 2009 and January 2010, with the highest increase 
of 80 percent in Ntcheu and lowest increase of 34 percent 
in Phalombe. Since these increases in real ganyu rates 
benefit both recipient and non-recipient households, 
the results suggest that the rural economy-wide benefits 
of the subsidy programme are very strong. These high 
wages also enabled poor households to spend less time 
on ganyu in order to earn income adequate to purchase 
food whenever their own stock runs out. This reduction 
in time spent on ganyu was universally reported in 
focus group discussions and life histories of beneficiary 
households. For earlier years of the FISP, survey and FGD 
work in 2006/07 demonstrated similar processes of falling 
maize prices, rising wage rates, and falling time spent 
on ganyu from 2005 to 2007. Surveys and FGDs in 2009 
suggested that from 2007 to 2009, rising maize prices 
and constant nominal ganyu rates led to some fall back 
in real ganyu rates. This has then been strongly reversed 
from 2009 onwards, as discussed above.
3.2 Impacts on farm input 
markets
The farm input subsidy programme can have several 
impacts on the input market system depending on the 
scale, targeting and other implementation modalities. On 
one hand, a poorly targeted large scale programme results 
in displacement of commercial sales and introduces 
disincentives for private investments in input markets. On 
the other hand, a well targeted programme can stimulate 
additional demand for commercial fertilisers among 
subsidised households by improving the productivity 
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Figure 2 GDP Growth, Agricultural Growth, Poverty and Inflation, 2003 – 2010 
 
 
Source: Computed by authors based on data from Reserve Bank of Malawi and NSO data 
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Blantyre and Zomba households reported improved tobacco prices co pared to the 
previous season. With respect to wages (figure 3c), there is an increase in wages over time 
as reported by households, and these increases occurred in all the districts surveyed. In 
terms f levels, in Mzimba and Kasungu households reported the highest wage rates while 
Thyolo and Phal mbe households r ported the lowest wage rates.  
 
These wage rates and maize price developments were also widely reported in focus group 
discussions and life histories of some of the beneficiaries. In most beneficiary life histories, 
among poor households, engaging in ganyu to earn income to purchase food is a 
common strategy and such improvements in wages and reduction in maize prices made 
maize more affordable even for poor households. This is confirmed in figure 3d which 
shows real increases in ganyu wages in terms of its maize grain purchasing power. Overall, 
the maize purchasing power of daily ganyu wages increased by 47 percent between 
January 2009 and January 2010, with the highest increase of 80 percent in Ntcheu and 
lowest increase of 34 percent in Phalombe. Since these increases in real ganyu rates 
benefit both recipient and non-recipient households, the results suggest that the rural 
economy-wide benefits of the subsidy programme are very strong. These high wages also 
enabled poor households to spend less time on ganyu in order to earn income adequate 
to purchase food whenever their own stock runs out. This reduction in time spent on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The average exchange rate in 2010 was MK150=1 US Dollar. 
Figure 2 GDP growth, agricultural growth, poverty and inflation, 2003 – 2010
Source: Computed by authors based on FISS3 survey data
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ganyu was universally reported in focus group discussions and life histories of beneficiary 
households. For earlier years of the FISP, survey and FGD work in 2006/07 demonstrated 
similar rocesses of falling maize prices, risi g wage rates, and falling time spent on ganyu 
from 2005 to 2007. Surveys and FGDs in 2009 suggested hat from 2007 to 2009, rising
maize prices and constant nominal ganyu rates led to some fall back in real ganyu rates. 
This has then been strongly reversed from 2009 onwards, as discussed above. 
 
Figure 3 Average Maize Prices, Tobacco Prices and Ganyu Wages 2009 – 2011 
 
 
Source: Computed by authors based on FISS3 survey data 
 
3.2 Impacts on Farm Input Markets 
 
The farm input subsidy programme can have several impacts on the input market system 
depending on the scale, targeting and other implementation modalities. On one hand, a 
poorly targeted large scale programme results in displacement of commercial sales and 
introduces disincentives for private investments in input markets. On the other hand, a 
well targeted programme can stimulate additional demand for commercial fertilisers 
among subsidised households by improving the productivity and profitability of their 
farming activities and their ability to finance fertiliser purchases. Table 4 shows the 
quantity of subsidised and commercial fertilisers acquired by households in 2009/10 and 
2010/11 seasons by IHS2 poverty status compared with commercial fertilisers in the IHS2. 
Among poor households the average quantity of subsidised fertilisers declined from 54 
kilograms in 2009/10 to 47 kilograms in 2010/11 while commercial fertilisers increased 
from 48 kilograms to 61 kilograms. A similar trend is observed among non-poor 
households, and may be related to economy-wide impacts of the programme. The data 
also show that both poor and non-poor households supplement subsidised fertilisers with 
commercial fertilisers, but among the poor the higher the number of seasons a household 
benefits from the subsidy the lower the supplementation with commercial fertilisers. No 
consistent pattern emerges with respect to non-poor households that are subsidised.  
Figure 3 Average maize prices, tobacco prices and ganyu wages 2009 – 2011
S rce: Computed by authors based on FISS3 survey data
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and profitability of their farming activities and their ability 
to finance fertiliser purchases. Table 4 shows the quantity 
of subsidised and commercial fertilisers acquired by 
households in 2009/10 and 2010/11 seasons by IHS2 
poverty status compared with commercial fertilisers in 
the IHS2. Among poor households the average quantity 
of subsidised fertilisers declined from 54 kilograms in 
2009/10 to 47 kilograms in 2010/11 while commercial 
fertilisers increased from 48 kilograms to 61 kilograms. A 
similar trend is observed among non-poor households, 
and may be related to economy-wide impacts of the 
programme. The data also show that both poor and 
non-poor households supplement subsidised fertilisers 
with commercial fertilisers, but among the poor the 
higher the number of seasons a household benefits 
from the subsidy the lower the supplementation with 
commercial fertilisers. No consistent pattern emerges 
with respect to non-poor households that are subsidised.
A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 commercial 
purchases with 2004/05 purchases shows a mixed picture 
among different households. On one hand, among the 
category of poor households only those that have had 
access to the subsidy over 1 season and 3 seasons are on 
average purchasing more in 2010 than in 2004/05. On 
the other hand, among the non-poor households only 
for households that have had access to the subsidy in 
the past 2 and 4 seasons do we witness purchases above 
the 2004/05 levels. This suggests some crowding out of 
commercial fertiliser sales due to the subsidy programme, 
although the decline in commercial purchases also 
occurred among households that have never received 
subsidised fertilisers. However, it should also be noted 
that the average prices of commercial fertilisers have 
substantially increased from MK37 per kilogram in 
2004/5 to MK97 per kilogram in 2010/11, an increase of 
162 percent over the period; this might have dampened 
the demand for commercial fertilisers.
Table 5 presents regression results of the factors that 
affect participation in the commercial fertiliser market and 
the demand for commercial fertilisers. Model (1) shows 
that the probability of participation in the commercial 
fertiliser market in 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2010/11 is 
positively influenced by male headship of household, 
number of adult equivalent members, years of education 
of household head, fertiliser prices, initial access to credit 
and value of assets. The probability of participation falls 
significantly with quantity of subsidised fertilisers and 
poverty. In addition, participation is higher in the central 
region than in the southern region and higher in 2002/03 
and 2003/04 seasons than in 2010/11 season. However, 
we find a positive relationship between the price of 
fertilisers and participation in commercial fertiliser 
market as was the case in Ricker-Gilbert et al (2010). 
The marginal effect is just 1.7 percent, implying that 
households that decide to participate in the commercial 
market do so regardless of small increases in prices. The 
other unexpected result is the distance to the main road 
where the coefficient is positive. Nonetheless, given the 
presence of fertiliser markets in remote areas, distance 
to the main road maybe a poor proxy for the transaction 
costs to input markets and its marginal contribution to 
the probability of participation is less than 1 percent. 
Model (2) estimates the demand for commercial 
fertilisers for households that bought commercial 
fertilisers in the IHS2 only. This informs us about the 
buying behaviour of these households as a result of 
the FISP. The results show that demand for commercial 
fertilisers is positively associated with number of adult 
equivalents, years of education of household head, maize 
prices, initial access to credit and value of assets; and 
it is negatively associated with quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers and poverty. With respect to the coefficient 
of quantity of subsidised fertilisers, the elasticity shows 
that a 1 percent increase in subsidised fertilisers reduces 
demand for commercial fertilisers by 0.39 percent. This 
suggests that subsidised fertilisers displace commercial 
fertiliser purchases among those who purchased 
fertilisers in 2002 – 2004 seasons. These households 
accounted for 54.1 percent of the total subsidised 
fertilisers in the sample, and using the relative shares 
of subsidised fertilisers we obtain weighted elasticity 
of -0.21, as the overall effect of subsidised fertilisers 
on commercial demand. However, we find a positive 
Table 4 Quantity of subsidised and commercial fertilisers by IHS poverty status (kg)
Times of 
subsidy 
access
Poor households in IHS2 Non-poor households in IHS2
Subsidy Commercial Subsidy Commercial
N 2009 2010 2004/5 2009 2010 N 2009 2010 2004/5 2009 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
All
4
17
15
18
22
37
114
227
0
3
44
52
59
51
70
54
0
12
20
36
50
38
66
47
82
37
176
68
130
52
72
78
58
61
126
29
54
31
40
48
55
79
92
80
70
51
51
61
11
18
13
23
22
37
112
236
0
10
32
35
49
54
75
53
0
17
17
44
39
40
74
49
691
123
221
174
79
162
116
165
132
246
157
98
141
72
61
100
128
250
181
99
151
102
63
109
Source: computed by authors based on IHS2 and FISS3 data
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coefficient of average district fertiliser prices, which is 
unexpected, but it is statistically insignificant. This maybe 
partly due to the high level of aggregation of fertiliser 
prices from survey data that might have dampened the 
changes in fertiliser prices and as observed earlier that 
small changes in prices do not hamper participation 
in the fertiliser market for households that decide to 
participate due to the perceived benefits of applying 
fertilisers.
Model (3) uses a sub-sample of households that 
purchased commercial fertilisers either in IHS2 or/and 
FISS3, and captures those households that might have 
entered the commercial market during the subsidy 
period – hence those that did not buy in IHS2 but 
bought commercial fertilisers in FISS3. If the subsidy 
encourages purchase of commercial fertilisers among 
some households, for example those that see the benefits 
of applying subsidised fertilisers, then we expect the 
elasticity with respect to subsidised fertilisers to fall 
in model (3) compared to model (2). The coefficient of 
subsidised fertilisers shows an elasticity of -0.29, implying 
that a 1 percent increase in subsidised fertilisers leads to 
a 0.29 percent reduction in the demand for commercial 
fertilisers among those that purchased commercial 
fertilisers in either IHS2 or/and AISPS. The weighted 
elasticity using relative shares of subsidised fertilisers 
is -0.15 for the whole sample of panel households. This 
elasticity is lower than the -0.39 observed for panel 
households that initially bought commercial fertilisers 
in IHS2. The demand for commercial fertilisers also falls 
for poor households and households that participate 
in labour markets but increases with number of adult 
equivalents, education, land holding size, average 
maize prices and value of assets. The demand is also 
much higher in the central region and northern region 
compared with the southern region, possibly due to the 
cultivation of tobacco in the central and northern region.
3.3 Direct beneficiary 
household impacts
3.3.1	 Household	food	security
Improvements in maize production should lead 
to improved food availability and food security for 
beneficiary households. In all the panel surveys, 
households were asked whether they considered their 
Table 5 Factors influencing participation and demand for commercial fertiliser
Independent variables
(1) Participation in 
commercial 
fertiliser market 
(Probit)
(2) Demand for 
commercial fertilisers 
if bought in IHS2
(Tobit)
(3) Demand for 
commercial fertilisers 
if bought in IHS2/
FISS3
(Tobit)
dF/dx z elasticity z elasticity z
Inverse Mills ratio
Age of HH head (years)
Male HH head *
Number adult equivalents
Years of education HH head
Extension advice on fertilisers
Land in hectares 
Quantity of subsidised fertilisers in kg
Poor household self-assessment *
Average district maize prices – May-Oct 
Fertiliser prices at EA level
Initial Access to credit in 2004/05
Business enterprise (0/1)
Distance to main road in km
Value of assets in MK
Participation in labour market (0/1)
Received remittances *
North *
Centre *
2002/03 season *
2003/04 season *
-
-0.0032
0.2565
0.0697
0.0576
-0.1432
-0.0037
-0.0092
-0.4415
0.0177
0.0168
0.7121
0.0248
0.0007
0.0000
-0.0161
-0.0394
0.0404
0.3286
0.7935
0.7665
-
-0.95
2.03b
2.46b
3.46a
-0.90
-0.72
-5.28a
-1.75c
0.98
4.00a
3.64a
0.22
0.21
3.51a
-0.15
-0.36
0.20
2.02b
2.27b
2.14b
0.4310
0.4340
0.0243
2.4883
0.9013
0.0118
-0.0202
-0.3904
-1.3844
4.3367
0.6593
0.2965
-0.2892
-
0.0618
-0.1651
-0.2504
0.3193
0.8551
0.7005
0.5197
0.57
0.72
0.06
3.66a
2.19b
0.16
-0.61
-1.91c
-2.07b
2.58a
0.54
2.52a
-1.13
-
3.20a
-1.23
-1.01
2.67a
2.98a
1.81c
1.47
0.5489
-0.1807
-0.0117
1.2548
0.4195
0.0045
0.2739
-0.2912
-0.9027
1.2089
0.1065
0.1316
-0.0930
-
0.0360
-0.1153
-0.1113
0.2008
0.3700
0.3001
0.1258
1.60
-0.65
-0.06
4.89a
2.32b
0.13
3.84a
-2.92a
-3.02a
1.52
0.17
2.52a
-0.75
-
4.25a
-1.71c
-0.95
4.31a
3.27a
1.51
0.69
Wald chi2(20)
Prob > chi2
Number of observations
Number of households
108.58
0.000
926
463
148.22
0.000
564
282
179.81
0.000
533
353
Notes: These are random effects models. (*)  dF/dx and elasticities are for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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food consumption in the month before the survey 
to be inadequate or adequate. In order to assess the 
impact on food security, we created a dummy variable 
representing adequacy in food consumption equal to 
one if the household revealed that food consumption 
was adequate or more than adequate, and to zero if it 
was inadequate. 
Table 6 presents the fixed effects (within) estimates of 
the impact of the subsidy programme on food security. 
Model (1) results show that among households that 
received subsidised fertilisers continuously (6 times) 
about 22% more than non-recipients reported adequate 
food production, with the coefficient being statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Increasing frequency of 
fertiliser use also led to increasing frequency of reported 
adequate food production. Similarly with Model (2), using 
the quantity of fertilisers received, there is evidence of 
a positive and significant relationship between food 
consumption adequacy and quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers. These results are consistent with the qualitative 
evidence of increased maize production reported in focus 
group discussions, which might have improved food 
consumption. Holden and Lunduka (2010a) also find that 
receipt of subsidised inputs increases the probability of 
households being net sellers rather than net buyers of 
maize, and that 66% and 69% of surveyed households 
reported improvements in household and community 
food security as a result of the subsidy programme 
(although 60% of the households in their sample were 
still net buyers of maize despite the subsidy programme). 
3.3.2	 Impact	on	education:	
Primary	school	enrolment
We investigate the impact of beneficiaries’ access to 
subsidised inputs on schooling based on enrolment of 
the primary school age group (5 - 13 year olds) while 
controlling for household characteristics. This analysis 
uses a two-period panel, IHS2 and FISS, in which members 
of households older than 5 years were asked whether they 
were in school. This enabled us to generate an indicator of 
school enrolment at household level. Primary enrolment 
at household level is computed as the number of primary 
school age children in school divided by the total number 
of primary school going age children in the household. 
Table 7 shows results for the impact of subsidy access on 
primary school enrolment and the panel results indicate 
that the subsidy has a positive impact on schooling. 
Examining all households, there has been a general 
increase in school enrolment between the two periods, 
a change that was universally confirmed in focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews. The coefficients 
of 1-2 times, 5 times and 6 times access dummies to the 
subsidy programme are statistically significant at the 5%, 
1% and 10% level, respectively. However, there is no clear 
trend in the value of the coefficients of the number of 
times of receipt and primary school enrolment. Similar 
but weaker relationships are observed for the model 
sample estimated only for households categorised as 
poor in the IHS2. 
Table 6 Fixed-effects regression estimates of impacts on food consumption
Dependent variable = 1 if household had adequate 
or more food in the past month of the survey
(1) (2)
All Households All Households
β Z β Z
Dummy for 2006/7 survey
Dummy for 2008/9survey
Dummy for 2010/11survey
Quantity of subsidised fertiliser (kg)
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times*
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times*
Dummy received subsidy 5  times*
Dummy received subsidy 6  times*
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (hectares)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
0.1001
0.3354
-0.0934
-
0.0386
0.1173
0.1758
0.2163
0.0001
-0.0033
0.046
0.0001
0.0084
0.3953
1.6
4.14a
-1.09
-
0.61
1.34
1.45
2.23b
0.29
-0.33
0.82
0.08
1.32
4.73a
0.1132
0.3857
0.0331
0.0007
-
-
-
-
0
-0.0047
0.0428
0.0002
0.0067
0.3963
4.19a
13.48a
1.04
2.27b
-
-
-
-
0.14
-0.42
0.94
0.14
0.95
3.83a
R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob> chi-squared
N
Number of Households
0.1656
729.15
0.000
1844
461
0.1635
675.5
0.000
1844
461
Notes: * The dummies represent cumulative receipt at each survey round from 2005/06. Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
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The estimated positive impact of subsidy receipt on 
educational enrolment is consistent with anecdotal 
reports on programme impacts, with focus group 
discussion reports (School of Oriental and African Studies 
et al., 2008; Dorward and Chirwa, 2010a), and with Holden 
and Lunduka (2010) who report that 65% of respondent 
households perceived that there was a positive impact 
of subsidy receipt on school attendance.
3.3.3		 Impact	on	health:	Incidence	
of	under-5	illness	
Improvements in food availability at household level 
due to access to subsidised fertilisers may improve 
beneficiaries’ health  in a number of ways – through 
improved food security and nutrition from increased own 
production and income, and from increased ability to 
finance health care. This can be investigated in a number 
of ways. We examine the impact of subsidy receipt on 
incidence of illness using data for households that had 
under-5 members in 2004/5 and 2010/11. On average, 
about 59% of households had ill under-5 members in 
2004/5, but this fell to 49% in 2010/11. This impact was 
not commonly articulated in focus group discussions and 
key informant interviews. The econometric evidence of 
the impact of the subsidy programme on the health of 
children in beneficiary households shows that households 
that had access to subsidy at least 5 times were more 
likely to have under-5 children that had not fallen ill in 
the past two weeks of the survey (table 8). Overall, there 
is a negative relationship between access to subsidy and 
incidence of under-5 illness. In the panel regression 
analysis, the coefficients of dummies for households that 
have had access to subsidised fertilisers for 5 times and 6 
times are statistically significant at the 5% level. Holden 
and Lunduka (2010) also explored people’s perceptions 
of subsidy receipt on health, and report that 40% of 
respondents perceived that subsidy receipt improved 
health. Further evidence on the impacts of subsidy access 
on health, but not of access to FISP itself, is provided 
by Ward and Santos (2010), who examined the impact 
on stunting from access to Targeted Input Programme 
inputs. They found a significant reduction in stunting for 
each year of receipt of TIP inputs, and based on strong 
international evidence on the relationship between adult 
height and wages; discuss possible long term beneficial 
effects of increased adult height on earnings.
3.3.4	 Subjective	poverty	or	well-
being,	real	income	and	
assets
The panel surveys consistently collected information on 
self-assessment of well-being and we use the subjective 
measures as outcome indicators of participation in the 
farm input subsidy programme. Well-being is assessed 
using households’ subjective assessment of their poverty 
status based on a ladder ranging from 1 representing the 
poorest to 6 representing the richest. Table 9 presents 
results of the subjective assessment of poverty for panel 
analysis. The mean self-assessment of well-being for 
panel households increased from 1.66 in 2004/05 to 2.34 
in 2010/11, representing a 41% increase. After controlling 
for household and year effects in model (1), the results 
show that households’ self assessments were higher by 
54%, 69% and 68% in the 2006/7, 2008/9 and 2010/11 
surveys respectively as compared with the pre-subsidy 
survey, with positive coefficients of the year dummies 
Table 7 Fixed-effects regression estimates of impact on household school enrolment
Dependent variable = primary school enrolment at 
household level
Panel Households
Fixed Effects
Panel Households
Fixed Effects
(Poor in IHS2)
β Z β Z
Dummy 2011 for survey
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times
Dummy received subsidy 5  times
Dummy received subsidy 6  times
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (ha)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
-0.1279
0.3135
0.1881
0.3374
0.1977
0.0000
0.0523
0.1655
-0.0014
-0.0153
0.8174
-1.06
2.26b
1.55
2.70a
1.67c
-0.10
2.00b
2.24b
-0.65
-1.40
6.66a
-0.3782
0.5364
0.3776
0.5828
0.3795
0.0031
0.0780
0.0812
-0.0004
-0.0063
0.7802
-1.21
1.74c
1.16
1.87c
1.20
0.99
2.76a
0.91
-0.13
-0.42
4.35a
R-squared
Wald chi-squared
Prob > chi-squared
N
Mean of dependent variable: 2004/05
Mean of dependent variable: 2010/11
0.8148
0.8956
0.1158
31.15
0.001
653
0.8903
0.8100
0.1191
19.49
0.035
371
Notes: Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
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statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the 
estimated impacts of subsidy receipt by beneficiaries 
households are (except for access in 5 seasons) negative, 
but small and not statistically significant. The results 
in model (3) where we use the quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers are similar to model (1). In model (2) we use 
a sub-sample of panel households that were identified 
as poor in IHS2 and find similar results of no statistically 
significant relationship between self-assessed poverty 
and the receipt of subsidised fertiliser, but again the year 
dummies are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% or 5% levels.
We cannot, therefore, reject the null hypothesis that 
receipt of the subsidy does not statistically affect changes 
in self-assessment of poverty among beneficiaries. This 
suggests that the subsidy programme may have only 
weak direct income effects on beneficiary households. 
Table 8 Fixed-effects regression estimates of impact on incidence of under-5 Illness
Dependent variable = 1 if household had an ill under-5 member Panel households
Fixed effects
β t
Dummy for 2011 survey 
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times
Dummy received subsidy 5  times
Dummy received subsidy 6  times
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (ha)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
0.0165
-0.0913
0.1618
-0.3634
-0.2398
-0.0002
0.0498
-0.1766
-0.0016
0.0062
0.7752
0.16
-0.56
1.33
-2.05b
-2.11b
-0.53
0.81
-1.25
-0.28
0.25
3.30a
R-squared
F
Prob >F
N
Mean of dependent variable: 2004/05
Mean of dependent variable: 2010/11
0.5928
0.4895
0.1223 
35.24
0.000
446
Notes: Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
Table 9 Fixed-effects regression estimates of impact on subjective poverty assessment
Dependent variable = subjective assessment 
of poverty status (1=poorest – 6 =richest)
(1) (2) (3)
All Households Poor in IHS2 All Households
β z β z β z
Dummy for 2006/7 survey
Dummy for 2008/9 survey
Dummy for 2010/11 survey
Quantity of subsidised fertiliser (kg)
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times*
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times*
Dummy received subsidy 5  times*
Dummy received subsidy 6  times*
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (hectares)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
0.5362
0.6898
0.6825
-
-0.1513
-0.0771
0.0036
-0.0734
0.0002
0.0173
0.1301
-0.001
0.0215
1.5406
5.94a
5.82a
5.61a
-
-1.6
-0.61
0.02
-0.56
0.16
1.28
1.77b
-0.41
1.83b
12.1a
0.4931
0.5775
0.5187
-
-0.1063
0.0437
0.2582
0.0368
0.0073
0.0199
0.2542
0.0041
0.0478
0.9631
4.77a
3.40a
2.31b
-
-0.86
0.23
0.97
0.14
1.14
0.92
2.65a
1.01
2.16b
4.54a
0.3812
0.5339
0.5097
0.0226
-
-
-
-
0.0002
0.017
0.129
-0.001
0.0209
1.5419
7.01a
7.28a
4.59a
1.00
-
-
-
-
0.18
1.04
2.05b
-0.34
1.80b
10.9a
R-squared
Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
N
Number of Households
0.1523
507.1
0
1844
461
0.1945
322.31
0
908
227
0.1498
371.13
0
1844
461
Notes: * The dummies represent cumulative receipt at each survey round from 2005/06. Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
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The results are consistent with sentiments expressed in 
qualitative interviews in which most households report 
that they are not able to produce surplus maize which 
could be sold to earn extra cash income. Some life histories 
with selected households revealed that although some 
have had access to subsidised fertilisers continuously they 
may still struggle to produce maize that takes them to the 
next harvest and have to rely on ganyu to earn income to 
purchase food. Small but insignificant positive effects are 
consistent with small direct improvements from subsidy 
receipt which may be overshadowed by wider positive 
changes affecting all households through indirect market 
effects of the subsidy and other positive changes from 
2002/3 and 2003/4 to 2006/7 and subsequent years. 
However, the difference between the dummy variables 
for 2008/9 and 201/11 is very small, suggesting that 
after a substantial improvement in perceived wellbeing 
from the pre-subsidy to 2006/7 surveys and a smaller 
improvement from 2006/7 to 2008/9 - there may have 
been little or no further improvement in perceived 
wellbeing from 2008/9 to 2010/11. In contrast with these 
results, however, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2010) do find a 
significant increase in satisfaction with life with increased 
receipt of subsidised fertiliser between the pre-subsidy 
and 2008/9 surveys.
The weak results on poverty impacts are consistent 
with the weak relationship between access to subsidy 
and, real incomes and asset accumulation. With respect 
to real incomes, Ricker-Gilbert (2011) finds no significant 
impacts of subsidy receipt on non-farm income or on 
total household income, although net value of rainy 
season crop production (a measure of farm income) 
is positively affected by subsidy receipt in the year of 
receipt (but not previous years), with each extra kg 
of fertiliser received increasing net crop income by 
MK174. Dorward and Chirwa (2012) in an informal rural 
economy modelling compare real income estimates 
for ‘target households’ (that is poor male- and female-
headed types) with and without the subsidy (with an 
average receipt of 75kg and 2 kg of subsidised fertiliser 
and hybrid maize seed respectively per household) but 
with constant prices (that is without any wider market 
equilibrium effects). Gains averaging around 7% (just 
under MK1,000) across poorer beneficiary households 
are estimated in the Shire Highlands with lower gains 
(around 4%, just under MK450) in the Kasungu-Lilongwe 
Plains, where poverty is less severe and poor households 
are less capital constrained and have lower returns to 
capital. SOAS et al. (2008) also state that increases in 
beneficiary incomes were reported in a number of focus 
group discussions in 2007.
With respect to asset accumulation, Holden and 
Lunduka (2010) in examining the impacts of subsidies on 
the value of assets and on livestock ownership measured 
in tropical livestock units find a general build-up in the 
real value of assets from 2006 to 2009, but no evidence of 
direct impacts of subsidy receipt on asset accumulation. 
Hence, there is no evidence of a general increase in 
livestock endowments, nor of direct subsidy impacts on 
asset accumulation. Similarly, Ricker-Gilbert (2011) report 
no significant impact of subsidy receipt on household 
livestock and durable assets for subsidy received in the 
survey year or in each of the previous three years. 
3.3.5	 Shocks	and	stresses
Changes in vulnerability of households to shocks 
and stresses are another possible impact of subsidy 
receipt on household welfare. Households experience 
a number of shocks and stresses and most of these 
shocks are agricultural related. Using the panel surveys 
we investigate whether there is a relationship between 
the extent of subsidization and shocks experienced by 
Table 10 Fixed-effects regression estimates of subsidy impact on shocks and stresses
Dependent variable = number of shocks experienced by 
household
IHS2 and FISS IHS2 and FISS
All households Poor in IHS2
β z β z
Dummy for 2011 survey
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times
Dummy received subsidy 5  times
Dummy received subsidy 6  times
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (ha)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
-2.1969
1.7775
2.1529
1.2333
1.432
0.0017
0.086
0.2269
-0.0504
-0.0137
6.6486
-2.88a
1.98c
3.06a
1.44
1.97c
0.62
1.19
0.61
-3.91a
-0.22
9.91a
-3.1106
1.9909
3.3164
2.3676
2.2015
0.0026
0.0818
0.1663
-0.0607
-0.176
8.0741
-6.28a
1.92c
4.46a
3.62a
3.49a
0.07
0.57
0.32
-3.78a
-1.82c
8.03a
R-squared
Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
N
Number of Households
0.0996
53.35
0.000
922
461
0.1441
156.92
0.000
454
227
Notes: Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
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households. Table 10 shows the fixed-effects regression 
model estimates using IHS2 and FISS survey data. With 
respect to the relationships between shocks and the 
frequency of subsidization, the estimated coefficients 
for dummy variables show that although the number of 
shocks declined between 2004/05 and 2010/11, recipients 
of fertiliser subsidies tend to experience more shocks 
than non-recipients. We find a statistically significant 
relationship between experience of shocks and those 
households that have had access to the subsidy, and 
the magnitudes are higher for recipients that have had 
access less than 5 times. Similar results are obtained in 
model (2) which only focuses on households that were 
classified as poor in IHS2. We find all the coefficients 
of dummies representing the frequency of receipts of 
subsidised fertilisers to be statistically significant at the 
10% or 1% levels. A possible explanation is that there is 
some targeting of the subsidy to households who have 
experienced shocks. This would be consistent with higher 
and more significant coefficients for households who 
have accessed subsidies less than five times.
We explore these issues further in Table 11, which 
reports results of the relationships between frequency 
of access to subsidised fertilisers and the incidence of 
agriculture-related shocks where these were reported as 
the most severe shock. The analysis shows mixed results. 
The full panel results based on all panel households 
show that the subsidy is not significantly related with 
the incidence of agricultural shocks, although generally 
the incidence of severe agriculture-related shocks has 
declined over time. However, for the sub-sample of 
panel households identified as poor in IHS2, there is no 
evidence that severe agriculture-related shocks have 
declined. However, importantly, households with access 
to subsidised fertilisers are less likely to have agriculture-
related shocks as their most severe shock, but there is 
no clear trend to suggest that the higher the number of 
times household access subsidies the lower the number 
of agriculture-related shocks that households experience. 
Again these results may reflect more on the likelihoods 
of subsidy receipt by poor households affected by severe 
agriculture-shocks than on the impacts of subsidy receipt 
on vulnerability to agriculture-shocks.
In summary, the evidence on changes in shocks and 
stresses is rather mixed. Overall, the number of shocks 
experienced by beneficiary households has fallen 
significantly over time, although those with access to 
subsidised fertilisers continue to experience shocks 
and stresses. However, among beneficiary households, 
agriculture-related shocks are less likely to be the most 
severe shocks; hence the subsidy appears to have helped 
poor households to be cushioned or resilient against 
agriculture-related shocks.
There is a decline from 24% to 13% in households 
that experienced lower crop yields due to weather or 
rainfall as most severe shocks between IHS2 and FISS3, 
respectively (Table 12). Other agriculture-related shocks 
whose incidence declined were large falls in sale price 
of crops and large rise in prices of food. The relative 
importance of chronic and acute illnesses appears to 
have risen as a result of the decline in importance of 
severe agricultural shocks.
4.0	 Impacts	from	Life	
Stories	of	Beneficiary	
Households
The analysis of life stories from selected beneficiaries 
reveals a mix of the impact of the subsidy on their 
well-being. While there are positive stories about the 
increase in food production at household level among 
most households that receive subsidies, the life histories 
illustrate the challenges of the programme in delivering 
Table 11Fixed-effects regression estimates of impact on agricultural-related shocks and stresses
Dependent variable = 1 if most severe shock experienced 
was agricultural related
IHS2 and FISS IHS2 and FISS
All households Poor in IHS2
β z β z
Dummy for 2011 survey
Dummy received subsidy 1 – 2 times
Dummy received subsidy 3 – 4 times
Dummy received subsidy 5  times
Dummy received subsidy 6  times
Durable assets (000 MK)
Logarithm of land (ha)
Dummy male-headed household
Age of household head (years)
Years of education HH head (years)
Constant
-0.3539
0.1124
0.1085
0.1225
0.1694
-0.0001
0.0141
0.2132
0.0006
0.0072
0.2952
-2.52b
0.68
0.69
0.78
1.09
-0.19
1.44
3.54a
0.31
0.82
3.02a
0.0103
-0.2013
-0.3726
-0.4168
-0.1666
0.0032
0.0154
0.1772
-0.0016
-0.0115
0.5658
0.24
-1.83c
-3.39a
-3.47a
-2.18b
0.41
0.7
1.37
-0.57
-0.66
3.39a
R-squared
Wald Chi-squared
Prob>Chi-squared
N
Number of Households
0.1293
81.15
0
922
461
0.1634
58.13
0
454
227
Notes: Superscript a, b and c denotes statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors obtained through bootstrapping at 50 repetitions.
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direct benefits to beneficiary households. In most life 
histories of beneficiaries, particularly among the most 
vulnerable groups (female-headed, elderly-headed and 
child-headed households), the stories were that the 
subsidy programme has enabled them to produce ‘a bit 
more food’ than when they had no access to the subsidy. 
Appendix Box 1 and 2 provide selected sentiments from 
some beneficiaries on the impact of the farm input 
subsidy programme since the 2005/06 season. The 
qualitative analysis points to the following issues:
• In most cases, households that report 
success with the subsidy programme are 
those that are well to do and were already 
purchasing commercial fertilisers before 
the subsidy programme. For instance, one 
beneficiary who has had access to the subsidy 
over 5 seasons was also buying coupons 
that enabled him to profit from tobacco 
cultivation, and claimed to have transformed 
his life from poor category to the well-to-do 
category.
• In households that reported receipt and 
use of 2 fertiliser coupons, such households 
are likely to talk positively about the extent 
to which the subsidy improved their food 
production for such years compared to 
households that received less than 2 bags 
of subsidised fertiliser.
• Sharing of coupons is widespread. Most 
households that have participated in the 
subsidy programme attributed the perceived 
failure of the programme to change their lives 
significantly to the inadequate amounts of 
fertilisers obtained under the programme. 
This is particularly the case for households 
that never used fertilisers prior to the subsidy 
programme. Many life stories described how 
the full package of the subsidy was beginning 
to change their lives, only to experience 
drifting back into poverty due to the dilution 
of the subsidy as a result of the redistribution 
that takes place at village level.
• There is also a tendency for beneficiaries to 
spread the subsidised inputs thinly over a 
larger parcel of land. Even among households 
that receive 2 bags of subsidised fertilisers, 
there were sentiments that the subsidised 
fertiliser was not adequate for the amount of 
land the household has for maize cultivation. 
This is exacerbated by the lack of technical 
advice on the appropriate use of fertilisers, 
with most households expressing lack of 
access to agricultural extension services.
• There is widespread recognition that the 
subsidy has helped beneficiary households 
to produce a ‘bit more maize’ and more 
importantly in reducing the purchase price 
of maize even the in lean months of January 
and February. Most of the beneficiaries 
interviewed, particularly those that are still 
not able to produce own maize to last them 
to the next season, consider a low purchase 
price of maize as one major benefit of the 
programme.
• Households that are not able to produce 
maize that lasts up to the next harvest tend 
to purchase from the market. Most poor 
households engage in ganyu to earn incomes 
to buy maize and most reported that ganyu 
wage rates have been increasing while maize 
Table 12 Most severe shocks and stresses experienced by households (%)
Most severe shock experienced for panel households IHS2 FISS3
2004/5 2010/11  
Lower crop yields due to weather/rainfall
Crop diseases or crop pests
Livestock died or were stolen
Household business failure non-agricultural
Loss of salaried employment or non-payment
End of regular assistance, aid or remit
Reduced ganyu opportunities/wage rates
Large fall in sale prices for crops
Large rise in price of food
Short acute illness/accident of HH member
Chronic illness, disability or ageing of HH member
Birth in the household
Death of HH member
Marriage/other social event
Increased expenditure demands
Break-up of the household
24.45
0.78
3.01
3.41
1.85
1.01
5.60
19.30
9.05
1.15
2.45
4.23
14.54
1.60
2.82
1.60
13.34
1.35
6.09
1.61
0.74
0.7
1.05
7.07
3.33
17.84
8.84
0.75
10.48
2.95
2.79
1.92
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prices have been falling and maize is locally 
available. This has enabled the poor to afford 
purchase of maize based on ganyu incomes 
which have also improved over time. Due to 
higher wages, households reported that they 
have reduced the amount of time they spend 
on ganyu and there has also been an increase 
in opportunities to operate off-farm income 
generating activities.
• Poor and vulnerable households such as 
female- and/or elderly-headed households 
that received subsidised fertilisers rarely 
supplement these fertilisers with commercial 
purchases, leading to application of 
subsidised fertilisers on larger parcels of 
land. Generally, where subsidised fertilisers 
are supplemented by commercial fertilisers, 
such households were buying commercial 
fertilisers prior to the subsidy and/or they are 
better off households that are also receiving 
subsidies. The quantitative analysis also 
shows that the supplementary commercial 
fertilisers are much less for poor households 
than for non-poor households that had 
access to subsidised fertilisers.
5.0	 Prospects	for	
Sustainable	Graduation
The panel data analysis and the analysis of the case 
studies of beneficiaries also highlighted two challenges 
that have implications on direct beneficiary impacts and 
prospects of graduation from the subsidy programme: 
targeting and sharing of coupons at village level. These 
issued have been documented in Dorward and Chirwa 
(2011), but here we use panel data to illustrate the 
challenges of beneficiary targeting. Both targeting and 
size of the benefit package have implications on creating 
enabling environments for sustainable graduation from 
input subsidies. With respect to targeting, the targeting 
criteria in the FISP remain quite broad with the main 
criteria being ‘resource poor households’, and this has 
meant that a large proportion of households is eligible 
from the perspective of communities (SOAS et al, 2008). 
Although the FUM (2011) study suggests that all the 
households conformed to the criteria by the reason they 
gave for their being selected for the subsidy programme, 
a majority (60%) indicated that their being ‘very poor’ 
justified their receipt of coupons – but no information 
is provided on the status of households who did not 
receive the subsidy. 
When we use the IHS2 poverty status of beneficiaries, 
as their initial condition, and data from IHS2 and FISS3 
surveys, we find that the poor and non-poor are equally 
likely to receive subsidised farm inputs. The broadness 
of the targeting criteria therefore leads to high targeting 
errors. Figure 5 presents the proportion of the households 
that were identified as poor in the IHS2 based on per 
capita expenditure and their relative access to subsidised 
fertilisers in the past 6 agricultural seasons. The figure 
shows that only a third of those that had never received 
subsidised fertilisers were poor households in 2004/05. 
This would be broadly in line with the poor being more 
likely to receive subsidy coupons. However, among 
recipients of subsidised fertilisers, the highest proportion 
of the poor is in the category that only received the 
subsidy once in the past 6 seasons while for those that 
have continuously received fertiliser subsidy only about 
51 percent were identified as poor in 2004/05. The panel 
data on who received subsidised fertilisers generally 
show that on average only half of the recipients were poor 
households on the basis of IHS2 poverty classification.
As observed above, non-poor households bought 
more commercial fertilisers on average than poor 
households although they received equal amount 
of subsidised fertilisers. This suggests that non-poor 
households could generally afford commercial fertilisers 
and receipt of coupons among them largely represented 
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targeting inclusion errors. This is also confirmed by the 
fact that there was no clear pattern in the perceptions 
of respondent households on which group was more 
likely than others to receive coupons, between better off 
farmers and poor and vulnerable households (Dorward 
and Chirwa, 2011).
With respect to redistribution of subsidy coupons 
within the villages, this practice has been widely reported 
by beneficiaries and from previous evaluations which 
indicate that a sizable proportion of households receive 
less than 2 coupons per household. Dorward and Chirwa 
(2011) find that 58 percent of households that received 
coupons in 2010/11 received less than 2 coupons; an 
increase from 49 percent in 2008/09 (Dorward et al, 
2010). Table 13 shows the coupon allocation processes 
by the district, and it is evident that although the open 
system is widely used for allocation and distribution 
of coupons, redistribution is widespread within the 
village. On average, just under 80 percent of households 
indicated that open meetings were used in the allocation 
of coupons, with the highest proportion (97 percent) 
in Phalombe and the lowest (54 percent in Lilongwe). 
Similarly, use of open meetings in the distribution of 
coupons was also popular in the 2010/11 season, with 
94 percent indicating the use of open forums. Lilongwe 
had the lowest proportion of 81 percent while Mzimba 
and Ntcheu had universal use of open forums in coupon 
distribution. The use of redistribution of coupons, 
which is unofficially organized by traditional leaders, 
is widespread. On average, just under 70 percent of 
respondents reported redistribution of coupons where 
sharing is organized in the 2010/11 season, compared to 
43 percent in the 2008/09 season. Kasungu and Mzimba 
had a low incidence of redistribution, with only about 
a third of respondents reporting that such practices 
occurred in their village while for the rest of the districts 
redistribution was confirmed by more than two-thirds 
of respondents. 
Widespread redistribution of fertiliser coupons was 
also confirmed from focus group discussions and life 
histories of beneficiaries. In focus group discussions, 
there was a mix of views on the extent of openness in 
the targeting processes, with politics playing a major role 
in some cases. Some groups also reported widespread 
sharing of coupons after the formal allocation process. 
Life histories of some beneficiaries also reported the 
problem that sharing of coupons diluted the direct 
benefit per household. The practice of redistribution of 
subsidised input undermines the direct impact of the 
programme on beneficiary households and is likely to 
reduce the effectiveness of the direct impacts of subsidy 
programme and undermines the potential for some 
households to graduate from the programme. 
The issues of targeting and dilution of the benefits 
illustrate the challenges in improving the welfare of 
beneficiaries and the limits to sustainable graduation 
from the farm input subsidy programme. Although 
some households have accessed subsidised fertilisers 
for all the six agricultural seasons, the direct impacts on 
socio-economic outcome variables are mixed and weak, 
and there is no consistent evidence that households 
that have always received fertiliser subsidy perform 
significantly better than those that have received 
subsidies intermittently or have received none in the 
six agricultural seasons covered in the study.
6.0	 Conclusions
The farm input subsidy programme which has been 
implemented in Malawi since the 2005/06 season has 
benefited households in different ways. The 2010/11 
season marked its sixth year of implementation and some 
households have had continuous access while others 
have had intermittent access to subsidised fertilisers. 
This paper set out to evaluate the impact of the subsidy 
programme on the economy, input market systems and 
welfare of beneficiary households using the panel data 
estimation of difference-in-difference estimator. 
Overall, although qualitatively communities point to 
the many benefits of the subsidy programme on food 
security, yields and other indicators of well-being, the 
econometric evidence that changes in welfare indicators 
are attributed to the direct effects of subsidy receipt is 
weak and mixed. These weak direct beneficiary impacts 
have also been found in earlier studies. For instance, 
Chirwa (2010) in an earlier impact evaluation also finds 
weak evidence of the direct impact of participation in 
Table 13 Systems of fertiliser coupon allocation and distribution in 2010/11 season (%)
District Open system of coupon 
allocation
Open system of coupon 
distribution
Redistribution of 
coupons within 
village
Mzimba
Kasungu
Lilongwe
Ntcheu
Zomba
Blantyre
Thyolo
Phalombe
Total
79.23
70.17
53.65
84.53
92.67
88.23
92.30
97.22
78.66
100.00
92.06
80.96
100.00
99.44
99.09
98.85
96.17
94.05
33.56
31.16
67.20
93.10
87.80
76.58
94.97
96.33
69.29
Source: Computed by authors based on FISS3 data
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the subsidy programme on beneficiary households’ food 
expenditure between 2004/05 and 2006/07. Similarly, 
Matita and Chirwa (2011), using panel data analysis, 
find mixed results on the direct impact of participation 
in the subsidy programme in improving agricultural 
growth of beneficiary households between the 2004/05 
and 2008/09 seasons among households in different 
income quintiles. Other studies also find no significant 
relationship between receipt of fertiliser coupons and 
asset accumulation, and mixed evidence on impacts on 
real incomes. The direct beneficiary effects are somehow 
masked by the stronger economy-wide effects, in which 
the subsidy benefits both recipients and non-recipients 
thereby weakening differences between the two groups.
Nonetheless, households tend to benefit from the 
economy-wide impact of the subsidy programme through 
low maize prices and increased ganyu wage rates that have 
been experienced since the introduction of the subsidy 
programme. The subsidy programme seems to have 
stronger economy-wide effects than direct beneficiary 
household effects. Over the past 6 agricultural seasons of 
subsidy programme implementation, the prices of maize 
have fallen, contributing to macroeconomic stability 
through falling inflation from double digit to single digit 
figures. The decrease in the maize prices, together with 
reported increases in ganyu wage rates, has meant that 
the poor and non-poor can afford to purchase maize at 
reasonable prices. In fact, there has a been real increase 
in ganyu wage rates measured in terms of the amount 
of maize a daily wage could purchase between 2010 
and 2011.
The impact analysis raises two challenges with 
implications for the direct beneficiary household 
impacts of the subsidy programme and their prospects 
for graduation. First, targeting of households remains 
problematic and a large proportion of non-poor 
households have access to subsidised farm inputs. 
This increases displacement of commercial sales and 
limit incremental production. However, the reduction 
in displacement in subsequent years suggests better 
prospects for input market development as one enabling 
condition for sustainable graduation. Secondly, the 
practice of redistribution of coupons at village level, 
which is largely driven by village-level politics, has led 
to dilution of the benefit package resulting in inefficient 
use of subsidised fertilisers among poor households that 
are not able to top up with commercial fertilisers, but 
cultivate larger parcels of land. This sharing of coupons 
tends to happen among poor households. These 
challenges of targeting, dilution of the benefit package 
and inefficiency in the application of inputs may also 
undermine prospects of graduation from the subsidy 
programme for most of the households.
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Appendix Box 1 Selected positive life stories from the subsidy programme
“The programme has enabled me to apply fertiliser. At first I was doing business but I was not able to buy 
fertiliser and could end up buying maize every year. Nowadays subsidised inputs are cheap and I am able 
to buy fertiliser after doing ganyu or selling firewood. I harvest enough food for my family although I do 
not get much to sell but I feel comfortable that I have enough food.” [Female headed beneficiary with access 
to coupons in 3 seasons, Blantyre].
“I have enough food and peace inside of me because I am assured that my grandchildren have something 
to eat. Other than that, there is no other manifestation of the impact of the subsidy.” [Widow beneficiary 
with access to subsidy since 2005/06 (6 seasons), Blantyre].
“I used to grow tobacco and buy commercial fertiliser before the subsidy programme. The major impact of 
the subsidy programme is that we are able to harvest enough food that run to next harvest and also sell 
some of it because we have surplus. Nowadays, we no longer go for ganyu work in other people’s farms to 
get good” [Married (69 year old) male head with access to subsidy in 6 seasons, Kasungu].
“There has been some change since the amount of food I have been harvesting for the past five years; this 
is due to access of fertiliser although the amount is very little for one to see. Without the subsidy I could 
only manage to harvest 2 ox-carts from a 1 acre field of maize (that is before 2005/6) but now at least I can 
get 3 ox-carts of maize” [Married (32 years old) male head with access to subsidy in 1 season, Lilongwe].
“I used to buy commercial fertiliser before subsidy and the year I did not receive coupons I bought 
commercial fertiliser. With respect to the impact of the subsidy programme, it has helped me in bringing 
food on my table. Without subsidy I think I would have been a tenant somewhere by now. Just imagine by 
the end of sales of 2006/07 I bought another bicycle, dining set and a radio out of the money earned 
through the subsidised fertiliser” [Married (31 year old) male head receiving 2 coupons in 4 seasons, tobacco 
farmer, Mzimba].
“Prior to the subsidy we used to buy fertiliser on credit, but we have been benefiting from the subsidy 
since it started in 2005/06. The major impact of the subsidy programme in all the years that my household 
has been benefiting is that we harvest enough food which runs up to next harvesting period. We also sell 
the surplus and earn money that we use to buy commercial fertiliser although its one or two bags only” 
[Married (78 year old) male head with access to subsidy in 6 seasons, Mzimba].
“The subsidy programme has really changed my life because I never go to bed hungry since prices of food 
have gone down. I am at least living a healthy life since ganyu prices have increased and I am able to earn 
K400 a day when I do ganyu” [Married (38 year old) female with access to subsidy in 3 seasons, Thyolo].
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Appendix Box 2 Selected limited impact life stories from the subsidy programme
“The 2007/08 season was a set back again owing to sharing of coupons compared to the receipt of one 
coupon per household. We no longer receive one coupon for each household alone and that was slowly 
walking us back down to the path we had been rescued from life of food in sufficiency – painful life” 
[Female head and widow with access to coupons in 6 seasons, Lilongwe].
“I have not seen real change in my life since 2005/06 season. I am as poor as I was in 2004/05 season. 
Subsidy fertiliser is not adequate as I have been getting 1 bag or sharing 1 bag with another household 
and in 2010/11 season I shared 1 bag with another villager. I am still failing to produce enough for my own 
consumption. If I had access to 2 bags each year I could have improved my life” [Female head and divorced 
with access to coupons in 5 seasons, Kasungu].
“Since 2005/06 and 2009/10, I experienced so many changes in my welfare because of the introduction of 
the subsidy program. In 2005/06 I received two fertiliser coupons and 2kg of hybrid seeds. During that 
season, I harvested ten 50kg bags of maize and had enough food throughout the year. However, in 
2007/08 I received one fertiliser coupon (25kg of 23-21-0 and 25kg of Urea) and harvested only two 50kg 
bags of maize. As a result, the food ran out after three months only.” [Married female beneficiary with access 
to subsidy in 4 seasons, Blantyre]
“The harvest has never been enough since 2006/07 season. The maize we have been harvesting has never 
gone past the month of January.  We depend on ganyu to survive. I have not really seen the real impact of 
subsidy on our household. The 1 bag of fertiliser we are benefiting from this programme we could afford 
to buy even before subsidy.  Even if this programme is to end I think we can still afford to buy a single bag 
of fertiliser, only what my husband has to do is to stop drinking beer” [Married (35 year old) female with 
access to subsidy in 6 seasons, Mzimba].
“The inputs subsidy programme has not yet had a positive impact on my life due to old age. In 2009/10 
season I only managed to harvest 5 bags of maize weighing 50 kg from the 2 bags of subsidised fertilisers 
that I got” [Married (81 year old) male head with access to subsidy in 2 seasons, Thyolo].
“Things did not just turn around immediately but the period we usually spend on ganyu is gradually being 
reduced. We are now able to keep maize nearly throughout the season without much ganyu on other 
people’s farms. Noting much of a change except slightly higher maize stock levels and a little saving which 
also ends up in buying the subsidised inputs” [Married female with access to subsidy in 6 seasons, Ntcheu].
“Now I harvest 2 – 3 bags of maize and this maize is not enough for my family. However, the subsidy has 
still helped my food security” [Widow (60 years old) female head with access to subsidy in 2 seasons, 
Phalombe].
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END NOTES
1 However, these figures reflect receipt of subsidized 
fertilizers and do not account for the quantity 
received and the last time they received for those 
that received less than six times.
2 Panel data on education and health are only 
available from IHS2 and the 2010/11 FISS and the 
panel analysis is based on two periods.
3 It is not clear why maize prices rose in 2008/9 – and 
without apparent hardship for the poor – probably 
due to a combination of rising ganyu wage rates 
and disruption of a thin market by official export 
of over 300,000MT of maize in late 2007 when it 
was thought that maize stocks were higher than 
they actually were (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). 
4 The average exchange rate in 2010 was MK150=1 
US Dollar.
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